The Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation by HUMMEL, JEFFREY ROGERS
San Jose State University 
SJSU ScholarWorks 
Faculty Publications Economics 
7-1-1978 
The Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory: A 
Reinterpretation 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
San Jose State University, jeff@jrhummel.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/econ_pub 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL. "The Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation" 
Journal of Libertarian Studies (1978): 151-165. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu. 
Journal ofLibertarian Studies, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 151-165. 0364-640817&/0601-0151 $02.00/0 
©Pergamon Press Ltd. 197&. Printed in Great Britain. 




JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
Department ofHistory, University of Texas 
Andrew Jackson's war upon the Second Bank 
of the United States and the economic conse­
quences stemming from it badly need a new 
historical interpretation. The traditional inter­
pretation asserts that Jackson's veto of the Bank 
re-charter and withdrawal of government 
deposits caused an inflation; Jackson's Specie 
Circular and the distribution of the surplus 
caused a panic and depression. Recent research 
has included much evidence that indicates that 
this traditional interpretation reqnires economic, 
and also political, revision. More importantly, 
however, the traditional interpretation suffers 
from a faulty economic theory. 
In no other field is the relationship between 
theory and history more explicit than in 
economic history. The obvious effect different 
understandings of economic theory will have 
upon the interpretation and explanation of 
specific historical-economic events makes the 
importance , of theory undeniable. It is also 
clear that, in most cases, the validity of the 
theory is decided a priori to history, on some 
other basis, and then is applied to the data. 
Rarely is history used to generate new economic 
theories. 
I believe that the economic theory that has 
guided the traditional interpretation of Jackson's 
Bank war is wrong. In this paper, I will show the 
evolution of the traditional interpretation and 
then survey the recent research that makes it 
historically untenable. I will conclude with a 
reinterpretation based on an economic theory 
that is both theoretically sound and historically 
consistent. 
I 
The first economist to write about the Jackson­
ians and banking was William Graham Sumner. 
In his two books, A History of Banking in the 
United States'" and Andrew Jackson,'" 
Sumner presented an analysis that foreshadowed 
subsequent accounts and set the pattern for 
what developed into the traditional interpre­
tation. That such should be the case is extremely 
ironic, for Sumner, himself a staunch advocate 
of /aissez-faire, perceived that laissez-faire was 
the central ideological tendency of the Jackson­
ians. "The democratic party was for a gener­
ation, by tradition, a party of hard money, free 
trade, the non-interference theory of govern­
ment, and no special legislation", he wrote.''' 
However, he differed in that the Jacksonians 
were radicals, using democratic means to throw 
off the power of the state, while Sumner was a 
conservative, defending laissez-faire from the 
twin evils of plutocracy and mob rule. Sumner's 
animosity toward Jackson was a consequence 
of focusing on the democratic and egalitarian 
aspects of Jacksonianism. Sumner, and 
other members of what Charles Grier Sellers, 
Jr., calls the "Whig" school of historiography,''' 
objected to the increased political role of the 
masses and the spoils system. Both of these 
were procedural changes in the form of govern­
ment rather than substantive changes in its size 
and power, but Sumner saw them as creating a 
social environment hostile to the preservation 
of a limited government. 
On the Bank war, despite his frequent moral 
judgments, Sumner was ambiguous, almost 
contradictory. He called the Bank war "one of 
the greatest struggles between democracy and 
the money power", a "premonition of the 
conflict between democracy and plutocracy",'" 
and he applauded the bullionists of the Jack­
sonian party who "put a metallic currency high 
up on its banner".''' Yet, he also felt that in 
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waging war on the Bank "Jackson's·adminis­
tration unjustly, passionately, ignorantly, and 
without regard to truth, assailed a great and 
valuable financial institution" .171 Sumner's 
praise for the Bank was not without reservation, 
and he accused Nicholas Biddle, president of 
the Bank, of insincerity, but on the whole he 
considered the Bank a successful restraint on 
the inflationary proclivities of the state banks. 
Sumner it should be noted, did not blame the 
economic instability of the years from 1829 to 
1840 entirely on Jackson's policies. He 
mentioned international factors - British 
capital flows, the discount rate of the Bank of 
England, and changing cotton prices - as 
contributing to the inflation of 1835-1836 and 
the Panic of 1837. 
Ralph C. H. Catterall, in The Second Bank 
of the United States, 1' 1 filled in the details 
around Sumner's basic account, eliminating the 
ambiguity and balance. Catterall, who wrote 
prior to the Federal Reserve System, believed 
that the Second Bank had provided the United 
States with the soundest currency it had ever 
had and that the reasons given by Jackson for 
vetoing its charter were "in the main beneath 
contempt" .1' 1 "Jackson and his supporters 
committed an offense against the nation when 
they destroyed the bank. . . . few greater 
enormities are chargeable to politicians than the 
destruction of the Bank of the United States."'"' 
Catterall did not carry his story through the 
later history of the Bank after it lost its national 
charter and became a state bank, but his praise 
of Biddle was also qualified. Catterall's book 
on the Bank was followed twenty years later by 
Reginald Charles McGrane's book on The 
Panic of 1837. 1" 1 McGrane, like Catterall, 
blamed Jackson's ignorant policies for the Panic. 
With the Progressive shift in American histor­
iography at the turn of the century, the attitude 
of historians towards Jackson became friendlier. 
Interestingly enough, despite the change in 
outlook, the historical debate was still conduc­
ted within the terms originally laid down by 
Sumner and his "Whig" contemporaries. 
Sumner had condemned the Jacksonians for 
unleashing majority rule; Turner, Beard, and 
Schlesinger praised them for the same thing. 
Later, the acceptance of the Marxist notion of 
class converted Turner's sectional conflict into 
Schlesinger's class conflict and helped obscure 
Sumner's insight into the anti-statist thrust of 
Jack:sonianism.'"' The Jacksonian opposition 
to state privilege was translated into ati oppos­
ition to capitalism, and the Bank war was 
interpreted from that angle. 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in The Age of 
Jackson,'"' correctly evaluated Jackson's 
destruction of the Bank as part of a calculated 
hard-money campaign which included a change 
of the mint ratio between gold and silver to 
bring gold back into circulation, an effort to 
suppress bank notes of small denominations, 
the establishment of an independent treasury, 
and an attack on state banks. However, he saw 
this campaign as motivated by an underlying 
labor class consciousness. After the publication 
of Schlesinger's book, Joseph Dorfman wrote 
"The Jackson Wage-Earner Thesis",rui an 
article demonstrating that the Jacksonians 
were not anti-capitalist, but really anti­
government. It is indicative of the strength and 
pervasiveness of Marxist class analysis among 
American historians that Richard Hofstadter, 
in The American Political Tradition, managed 
to convert Dorfman's refutation of Schlesinger's 
class thesis into a new class interpretation ­
one with the J acksonians as aspiring and rising 
entrepreneurs. [tsJ 
While the political nature of Jacksoniansm 
was the subject of considerable disagreement, 
the economic account remained largely unaltered. 
Schlesinger admitted that "In destroying the 
Bank, Jackson had removed a valuable brake 
on credit expansion."'"' Hofstadter complained 
that Jackson "had left the nation committed to 
a currency and credit system even more inade­
quate than the one he had inherited" .1171 Dur­
ing the next decade, four additional books deal­
ing directly with the Bank war expanded and 
fortified the traditional interpretation. Walter 
Buckingham Smith, in Economic Aspects of 
the Second Bank of the United States, 1" 1 
portrayed the Bank as an effective central bank, 
although like Sumner, he also stressed inter­
national factors. Thomas Payne Govan, in the 
biography; Nicholas Biddle: Nationalist and 
Public Banker, 1786-1844, 1" 1 praised Biddle 
as an astute central banker well ahead of his 
I 
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time, as did Fritz Redlich, in his two volume 
The Moulding ofAmerican Banking: Men and 
Ideas,'"' a work which particularly emphasized 
the imQilct of the European banking tradition 
on Anferica. The traditional interpretation 
received its most effective and popular present­
ation in Bray Hammond's highly overrated 
Banks and Politics in America: From the 
Revolution to the Civil War."'' Hammond, 
who had developed his ideas in a previous series 
of articles, grafted the traditional economic 
interpretation to the Hofstadter entrepreneurial 
thesis. 1221 
The economic theory to which Hammond, 
Redlich, Govan, Smith et a/. adhere and which 
is at the heart of the traditional interpretation 
may be called the sound banking doctrine. 
Banks have always issued more notes or deposit 
liabilities than they have monetary reserves to 
cover. This process is called fractional reserve 
banking, and through it, banks create money. 
Thus, an ante-bellum bank which issued $1000 
in notes with only $100 in specie (gold or silver 
bullion and coin) as reserves in its vault, had 
created $900 and had a reserve ratio of IOOJo. 
The sound banking doctrine holds that fraction­
al reserve banking is necessary and beneficial 
for a prosperous economy. There are insuffici­
ent quantities of gold and silver in existence to 
satisfy monetary needs. Money creation by 
banks is a needed service. However, monetary 
creation can go too far. Banks will overissue 
their notes and deposits and reduce their 
reserve ratios to dangerous levels if governed 
solely by the banker's desire for profit. That leads 
to inflation, economic instability, and wildcat 
banking. People will drown in a deluge of 
unbacked paper money. Therefore, external 
checks are necessary to insure that fractional 
reserve banking stays within certain limits and 
that reserve ratios stay at certain levels, and 
government must provide the checks. It can be 
seen that this doctrine occupies the middle 
ground between the extremes of hard money on 
the one hand, and inflationary banking or fiat 
money on the other. 1231 
Central banking is one of the means, accord­
ing to the sound banking doctrine, by which 
government can restrain private banks. Since 
the Second Bank of the United States was a 
nascent central bank, it was a useful institution. 
The state banks were inherently inflationary and 
tended toward wildcat banking, and the 
Second Bank restrained them. Because it was 
national and because it was the government 
depository, the Bank held a dominant position 
in the U.S. economy. In the process of its 
operations, it tended to receive the notes of 
state banks. Its mechanism of control was 
forcing the state banks to redeem their notes in 
specie. 
Jackson, by vetoing the charter of the Bank 
in 1832 and later removing from it the govern­
ment deposits, destroyed the Bank's effective­
ness as a central bank. He consequently 
unleashed the state banks, which overissued 
their notes and generated an inflationary boom. 
The government deposits were placed in pet 
banks, and this further encouraged credit 
expansion. Traditional accounts differ as to the 
precise cause of the Panic of 1837 and on 
whether or not it was made inevitable by the 
previous boom, but they all agree that certain 
of Jackson's policies contributed to bringing it 
about. First, the distribution of the surplus 
shifted bank reserves and made certain banks 
contract their note issue. Secondly, the Specie 
Circular increased the demand for specie and 
put a drain on the reserves of banks. The banks 
were compelled to contract and finally to 
suspend specie payment. 
Politically the Jacksonian attack on the Bank 
represented an alliance between two divergent 
groups, according to the traditional interpreta­
tion. One of these was the hard-money agrarians, 
who ended up defeating their own purpose. The 
other more important group included the 
aspiring capitalists who wanted state bank 
inflation and the state banks themselves, which 
wanted to be free from the Second Bank. Other 
motives at work include the political desire to 
bring the Bank within the Democratic fold and 
the desire of New York City bankers to escape 
the financial hegemony of Philadelphia, where 
the Bank was located. The importance of Jack­
son himself is disputed. Some picture him as a 
tool of his advisors, while others consider him 
to be the primary actor initiating the Bank war. 
The destruction of the national Bank repre­
sented the triumph of the aspiring capitalists 
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within the Jacksonian movement at the national 
level; "free banking" represented their triumph 
at the state level. "Free banking was an applica­
tion of laissez jaire to the monetary function", 
writes Hammond, and its adoption insured "a 
permanent policy of monetary inflation."'"' 
It was an inferior system, primarily because it 
was unregulated. 
These various propositions constitute the 
major tenets in the traditional interpretation, 
and they add up to a severe indictment of the 
Jacksonians. The- response of pro-Jackson 
historians to the difficult problem of reconciling 
these charges has been varied and ingenious. 
Robert V. Remini,'"' following in a direction 
pointed by Leonard D. White,'"' has emphasized 
the role of the Bank war in the growth of Pres­
idential power, considering that a positive good 
regardless of how it was used. George Rogers 
Taylor'"' admits that under Biddle the Bank 
performed splendidly, but argues that it had 
shown in the past that it had an immense 
potential for abuse lying dormant. The Bank 
was too independent from the national govern­
ment, and that justified not renewing its charter. 
Schlesinger, in a review of Smith's book,'"' 
goes so far as to take up the cause of the state 
banks, when he asserts that "the men in 
Jackson's day who were most nearly right from 
the viewpoint of economic growth were neither 
the Bank advocates nor the hard-money 
theorists but the soft money men of the 
West"."" None of these approaches questions 
the essential validity of the traditional interpre­
tation. 
II 
The recent scholarly work challenging the trad­
itional interpretation falls into two broad cate­
gories: political revisionism and economic 
revisionism. The political revisionism has been 
dominated, although not exclusively, by 
historians using statistical tools, and the 
pioneer in statistical methodology applied to 
the Jacksonian era is Lee Benson. Most of 
Benson's book, The Concept of Jacksonian 
Democracy: New York as a Test Case,'"' is an 
effort to develop an alternative to Marxist class 
notions in describing political behavior and 
does not relate specifically to the banking issue. 
Of that which does relate, much of it r~inforces 
the traditional interpretation. Benson, like 
Harnm_ond, feels that Jackson's attadJs.on the 
Bank was instigated from New Y orlc bfMartin 
Van Buren, but not for the same Jeason. 
Rather than an effort to gain financial ascen­
dancy for Wall Street, Benson construes tile 
Bank War as a diversion to relieve anti-monopoly 
pressure directed against the Regency banking 
system. "Seen in historical context, the Jack­
sonian 'Bank War' becomes a brilliant counter­
attack - not a bold offensive on behalf of 
free enterprise."'"' Benson's major revisionist 
contribution is his assessment of who was 
responsible for New York's "free banking" 
act. t32 1 "Free banking", it turns out, was not a 
scheme promoted by the Locofoco radical 
Democrats, with their anti-monopoly, hard­
money views; it was a scheme promoted by the 
Whigs. It was not consistent with Democratic 
ideas about limited government; it was consist­
ent with Whig ideas about positive state action. 
It restricted entry on the basis of capital, 
limited the liabilities of stockholders, provided 
stringent regulations, and established a board of 
bank commissioners. Most significantly, by 
making note issue dependent on holding-of state 
bonds, it forged a close alliance between the 
bank and state. "Free banking" was neither 
Jacksonian norlaissez-jaire. '"1 
Van Buren's prominence in the Bank war, 
along with charges of a New York-Virginia 
conspiracy, were finally called into question 
when Frank Otto Gatell published his article, 
"Sober Second Thoughts on Van Buren, the 
Albany Regency, and the Wall Street Conspir­
acy" ."'' Gatell points out that although the 
Regency had intimate connections with Albany 
banks, it was not that close to New York City 
banks. There was no reason for the Regency to 
champion the interests of Wall Street. In 
answer to Benson's version of the New York 
conspiracy, Gatell argues that politically the 
Regency did not need the Bank war; indeed, it 
was a fairly risky venture for Regency politicians. 
Gatell concludes that Jackson "still remains 
central to the Bank War"."" 
The political tenet of the traditional interpre­
tation, however, hinges not on New York but 
, I 
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on the supposition of general state bank oppo­
sition to the national Bank. That supposition is 
addressed in the most important work of 
political revisionism, Jean Alexander Wilburn's 
Biddle's Bank: The Crucial Years.'"' By 
carefuUy analyzing the vote over the Bank's 
re-charter in Congress in 1832, a vote on a 
resolution to Congress on that issue by the New 
York State legislature, petitions and memorials 
sent to Congress, and Biddle's correspondence 
with allies in which he organized support for 
the Bank, Wilburn attempts to determine 
exactly who supported the Bank. She finds that 
prior to Jackson's veto, support was over­
whelming, even among state banks: 
We have found that Nicholas Biddle was correct when 
he said, ''state banks in the main are friendly". Specif­
ically, only in Georgia, Connecticut, and New York was 
there positive evidence of hostility. A majority of state 
banks in some states of the South, such as North Caro­
lina and Alabama, gave strong support to the Bank as 
did both the Southwest States of Louisiana and Mississi­
ppi. Since Virginia gave some support, we can claim 
that state banks in the South and Southwest for the 
most part supported the Bank. New England, contrary 
to expectations, showed the banks of Vermont and New 
Hampshire behind the Bank, but support of Massa­
chusetts was both qualitatively and quantitatively weak. 
The banks of the Middle states all supported the Second 
Bank except for those of New York. There, the Mech­
anics' and Farmers' Bank together with the other banks 
Olcott controlled "arrayed a powerful force against 
the Bank". 1' 71 
V, Wilburn's much-needed refutation of the myth 
of state bank opposition to the national Bank is 
only slightly marred by her resurrection of the 
New York-Virginia conspiracy. In her version, 
the prime figure is Thomas Olcott, who is able 
to wield undue influence because of Biddle's 
failure to establish a branch of the Bank in 
Albany. 
Since the publication of Wilburn's book, two 
books have been written which examine the 
struggle over banking at the state level. Both 
used statistical analysis of voter returns. The 
first was James Roger Sharp's The Jacksonians 
versus the Banks: Politics in the States After the 
Panic of 183 7."" Sharp presents an overview 
of all the states, but selects for special concen­
tration Mississippi, Ohio, and Virginia. In each 
of those states he does the kind of voter corre­
lation introduced by Benson. His conclusion is 
that with the defeat of the Second Bank and the 
Panic of 1837 the Jacksonian campaign for 
hard money shifted into the state arena: 
The Democratic Party did not engage in the battle over 
banks and currency as the party of the entrepreneur in 
the age of enterprise. ... After the Panic of 1837, 
although the rhetoric of the two parties often obscured 
their real position, it is clear that the Whigs were the 
champions of the banks against the ''radicalism'' of the 
Jacksonians. Despite internal feuding, the main body 
of the Democratic party supported radical reform of 
the banks and, in some cases, their destructiQn. The 
party reflected, in both ethos and program, the hard­
1 
money position. lUI 
Sharp found that the hard-money program 
varied among states. In the more agrarian states, 
it was more radical, calling for the abolition of 
state-chartered corporate banks, while in more 
commercial states, the hard-money advocates 
compromised for less hard-line reforms. William 
Gerald Shade, in Banks or No Banks: The 
Money Issue in Western Politics, 1832-1865,'"1 
confmns Sharp's major fmdings. Shade focuses 
on the five states of the Old Northwest, with 
special statistical attention on Illinois (where he 
interestingly finds confirmation for Benson's 
ethno-religious voting behavior thesis). Both 
books agree that nowhere was "free banking" 
a Democratic proposal. When it passed, it was 
with the support of the Whigs and occasional 
defecting Democrats. 
The most recent contribution to the political 
revision of the traditional interpretation is 
David A. Martin's article, "Metallism, Small 
Notes, and Jackson's War with the B.U.S."'"'· 
Martin is an economist, and some of his fmdings 
can be considered economic revisionism. 
However, his main effort consists of putting 
the Bank war within the context of a broader, 
encompassing hard-money (or metallist) program 
at the national level. In doing so, he amplifies 
Schlesinger's original presentation. According 
to Martin, the specific planks of the program in 
addition to the Bank war involved: (1) a change 
in the mint ratio, 1" 1 (2) the establishment of 
branch mints to increase coinage, (3) the 
reinstitution of legal tender for foreign coins, 
(4) the prohibition of small notes, and (5) the 
establishment of a government bank without 
note-issning authority. The second and third 
planks have previously escaped historians; the 
fourth, of course, failed; and the last evolved 
------------
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into the independent treasury. Martin is even 
sympathetic with the Jacksonian program to the 
extent that, while he agrees with the traditional 
interpretation that the Bank provided a uniform 
currency for large, interregional transactions, 
he claims that the overissue of small notes drove 
specie out of circulation and made smaller and 
local transactions more chaotic than generally 
supposed. 
III 
The economic revision of the traditional inter­
pretation has been accomplished by cliometric­
ians, practitioners of the new economic history. 
The cliometricians, most notably Peter Temin, 
have completely demolished almost all of the 
major propositions of the traditional interpre­
tation. The first work of economic revisionism 
to appear was Richard H. Timberlake, Jr.'s, 
"The Specie Circular and the Distribution of 
the Surplus".''" Compared to Temin and the 
others that followed, Timberlake's article is 
only mildly revisionist, but it broke the ground. 
By examining the volume of public land sales 
and their importance within the economy, 
Timberlake reached the conclusion that the 
"Specie Circular was dramatic but innoc­
uous",''" in its impact upon the economy. He 
also discovered that distribution of the surplus 
resulted in very small interstate species flows and 
that the cooperation of state banks and state 
treasuries prevented any intrastate drain. Tim­
berlake is left with only a small interstate 
demand for specie (mostly against New York) 
as a cause~ for the Panic of 1837. Harry N. 
Scheiber in an article on pet banks questioned 
Timberlake's conclusion on the Specie 
Circular,1' 51 so Timberlake in a brief second 
article buttressed it with more evidence. 1" 1 
The next contribution to economic revisionism, 
George Macesich's "Sources of Monetary 
Distur~ance in the United States, 1834-1844",1" 1 
is broader in its scope. Building upon the 
suggestions found in Sumner and Smith, 
Macesich argues that international factors were 
actually to blame for the monetary disturbances 
of the Jacksonian era. U.S. prices were not 
autonomous, but linked to an international 
market. British capital flows were followed by 
specie imports or exports, which in turn forced 
expansion or contraction of the U.S. money 
supply and consequent changes in the price 
level. To reach his conclusion, Macesich con~ 
structed a series of figures for the stock of 
money in the U.S. from 1834-1845 along the 
same lines as the series constructed by Milton 
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartzi"! for 
a later period. He used the Friedman-Schwartz 
proximate determinants for analysis. 
Jeffrey G. Williamson, in an article entitled 
"International Trade and United States 
Economic Development, 1827-1843",1 .. 1 criti· 
cizes Macesich for using a static specie-flow 
balance of payments modeloand ignoring the 
' dynamic impact of the growth of the U.S. 
economy. It was real economic growth in the 
U.S. that induced both the capital inflows and 
the gold inflows (and an unfavorable balance 
of trade). Williamson attributes economic 
disturbances during the period not to exogenous 
external events but to an internal natural cycle, 
or long swing, in economic growth. I'" While 
Williamson and Macesich disagree over the 
source of economic disturbance, they both 
agree that the U.S. banking system responded 
passively in its monetary expansion and contrac­
tion to factors beyond its influence. In other 
words, neither granted the Bank war much 
significance. 
In a rejoinder, Macesich argues that capital 
flows induced growth, rather than vice versa, 1" 1 
but the next important contribution to the 
debate is Thomas D. Willett's "International 
Factors in Specie Flows and American 
Stability: 1834-1860". 1" 1 Willett raises theo­
retical objections to Williamson's model, but 
does not totally agree with Macesich. Instead, 
his hypothesis not only stresses international 
specie flows but includes the reaction of the U.S. 
banking system as an active agent. The 
Macesich-Williamson-Willett debate involves 
more issues than those raised by Jackson's 
Bank war, and by the time Willett's contribution 
appeared, Temin 's preliminary article had also 
been published. Nevertheless, the controversy 
in many ways anticipated Temin's findings. 
Another work of economic revisionism, one 
which Temin almost entirely incorporates, is 
Jacob Meerman's article, "The Climax of the 
;i:,:-: 
~, .. , 
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Bank War: Biddle's Contraction, 1833-1834".1"' 
Meerman studied the data on the contraction 
Biddle is credited with bringing on and found 
that it was a highly exaggerated event. Biddle's 
action resulted in a very small decrease in the 
rate of growth of the money supply and a very 
minor recession. 
The most sweeping economic revision of the 
traditional interpretation is contained in Te!Wn's 
book, The Jacksonian Economy,'"' and a 
prior article, "The Economic Consequences of 
the Bank War". 1" 1 Temin's work is based on 
an improved series for the stock of money in the 
U.S. from 1820 to 1858. Temin, like Macesich, 
uses the Freidman-Schwartz proximate deter­
minants, one of which is the reserve ratio (the 
percentage of bank circulating money - notes 
plus deposits - covered by specie reserves in 
bank vaults). According to the traditional inter­
pretation, one of the advantages of the Second 
Bank as a central bank was that it kept state 
bank reserve ratios higher than they otherwise 
would have been; Jackson's war supposedly 
precipitated a decline in the reserve ratio. Ternin 
found that, on the contrary, from the period 
1831 to 1837, when the reserve ratio should 
have been declining, that it actually remained 
fairly constant. There was an increase in the 
money stock, but it wasn't due to Jackson's 
war or the state banks. It resulted from an 
inflow of specie which increased bank reserves. 
However, Macesich 's guess that the specie came 
from England is wrong. The inflow resulted 
from increased specie imports from Mexico 
coupled with decreased specie exports to the Or­
ient. The importance of British capital was not 
that it was foUowed by specie but that it prevented 
the U.S. unfavorable balance of trade from driv­
ing the new specie overseas. 
Just as Jackson's Bank war had nothing to do 
with the inflation, his Specie Circular and the 
distribution of the surplus had nothing to do with 
the Panic of 1837. The major cause was a 
contraction started by the Bank of England with 
its high discount policy. It drew capital and 
specie out of the U.S. and abruptly ended the 
inflation. Furthermore, during the period of 
deflation and contraction following the brief 
recovery in 1838, conditions were not as bad as 
often pictured. Other of Temin's findings 
include the fact that reserve ratios were not 
lowest in the south and west; they were lowest 
in New England. In addition, the currency ratio 
(the percentage of money held by the public in 
the form of specie) rose dramatically after the 
destruction of the Bank, indicating a decrease 
in the public use of bank money. 
Since the publication of Temin's book, 
Edward J. Stevens, in his article "Composition 
of the Money Stock Prior to the Civil War","" 
has done a Friedman-Schwartz money stock 
analysis for 1842 to 1859. His figures are not 
strictly identical with Temin's, but they 
similarly show a rising currency ratio. Stevens 
points out that gold from California must have 
stayed in the hands of the public rather than 
passing into bank vaults. Stanley L. Engerman, 
in "A Note on the Economic Consequences of 
the Second Bank of the United States"'"' starts 
with the assumption that paper money is less 
expensive than specie and attempts to calculate 
the cost resulting from the increased currency 
ratio following the destruction of the Bank. He 
comes up with 0.150Jo of GNP annually. 
Hugh Rockoff has published various art­
icles on the nature of "free banking" .1" 1 In 
"Money, Prices, and Banks in the Jacksonian 
Era",E581 in addition to ::mmmarizing Temin's 
conclusions, he offers a profit maximization 
equation to explain the note issue behavior of 
banks. "American Free Banking Before the 
Civil War: A Re-Examination"'"' argues that 
"free banking" only led to wildcat banking if 
the statutory limit on the amount of notes that 
could be issued against state bonds significantly 
exceeded the market price of the bonds. Wildcat 
banking was a visible, but minor, problem. In 
"The Management of Reserves by Ante­
bellum Banks in Eastern Financial Centers","" 
which Rockoff co-authored with Roger H. 
Hinderliter, they attempt to subject the reserve 
behavior of eastern banks to econometric 
analysis. In his most recent article, "Varieties 
of Banking and Regional Economic Develop­
ment in the United States, 1840-1860", 1021 
Rockoff tries to determine if "free banking" 
laws, which he considers "the antithesis of 
laisseZ-faire banking laws", 1" 1 had any negative 
impact on regional economic growth: 
In summary, free banking was a mixed blessing. At 
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times it produced wildcat banking. But this was due 
primarily to defects in the land security system for 
circulating notes. When these defects were absent, free 
banking, judged on the basis of evidence presented 
above, performed at least on par with other syst~.'u1 
A fmal article that should be mentioned is 
Arthur Fraas' "The Second Bank of the United 
States: An Instrument for an Interregional 
Monetary Union".'"' Fraas makes an astute 
analogy between the condition of state banks 
prior to the establishment of the Second Bank 
and an international situation in which there are 
floating exchange rates. He asserts that the 
benefit from imposing a uniform national 
currency with the Bank must be weighed against 
the cost of fixing exchange rates and 
eliminating price autonomy between regions. 
He feels the latter hurt economic growth in the 
Western states. 
IV 
With the principal tenets of the traditional 
interpretation refuted, the crucial question 
becomes: how will all the data and recent 
findings be synthesized and integrated into a new 
general overview of the Bank war? Unfortun­
ately, the articles by Engerman, Rockoff, and 
Fraas all indicate that if any economic theory 
succeeds the sound banking doctrine, it will be 
the fiat money doctrine. Rockoff explains, for 
instance, that lower reserve ratios like those 
that existed in New England should not be 
construed as harmful. Just the opposite, they 
were good because they indicate that banks 
were using specie reserves more efficiently. 
"The reduction in the ratio of specie to money 
would be a benefit to the nation because it took 
real resources to produce specie reserves."'"' 
That assumption underlies Engerman's calcula­
tion on the cost of the destruction of the Bank. By 
lowering the currency ratio, the Bank permitted 
more efficient use of specie. If one follows 
that reasoning through, the most efficient 
currency becomes one that uses no specie at 
all - a completely fiat money supply. That is 
the standard by which some of the new economic 
historians are judging the banking of the 
Jacksonian economy. 
At first glance, Fraas appears to contradict 
the prevailing trend. He raises the question of 
the cost of uniform currency. But the costs he 
considers result from fixed exchange rates 
pegged to specie, and his ultimate preference is 
a system of state or regional fiat currencies, 
totally independent of each other and specie. 
The trend away from the sound banking to the 
fiat money doctrine is clearly exhibited in a recent 
article by Richard E. Sylla entitled "American 
Banking and Growth in the Nineteenth Century: 
A Partial View of the Terrain" .1"1 Sylla 
celebrates the demise of Redlich and his 
"quest for soundness" school. No longer will 
banking history be viewed as a "quest for 
soundness". Instead, it will be viewed in terms 
of the services banks perform towards encoura­
ging economic growth, and the most important 
of these is credit creation. Sylla favorably quotes 
Schumpeter to the effect that "sound money 
men of all times ... throw and still 'throw away 
the baby with the bath water' by condemning 
popular banking practices" .1" 1 Unsound money 
promotes growth. What in effect the new 
approach is coming around to is Schlesinger's 
advocacy of the soft-money men of the west, 
only the real soft-money men turn out to have 
been in the east and with the Bank. Only Ternin, . 
when he points to the rapid growth during the 
deflation following the Panic of 1837, and 
Williamson, with his long swing that leaves 
banks passive and irrelevant, have presented 
ideas that might be developed in a different 
direction. 
One of the problems with the traditional . 
interpretation and the sound banking doctrine 
that the new fiat money doctrine has not 
solved is providing an integrated causal explan­
ation for the business cycle. J. R. T. Hughes 
and Nathan Rosenberg, in an article written 
fifteen years ago, complained: 
This paper is prompted by the dissatisfaction of the 
authors with the state of the economic history of busi· 
ness fluctuations in the U.S. up to 1860. The existing 
literature dealing with the historical origins of business 
fluctuations is, we feel, dominated by sweeping gener~ 
alizations which, as they stand, are open to serious 
question. 1" 1 
Since Hughes and Rosenberg wrote that state­
ment, there has not really been much 
improvement. Except for Williamson's, most 
explanations are monetarist, but none show 
how monetary fluctuations affected business 
- - --· --­
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conditions. Those explanations, like Macesich's, 
that import the cycles from abroad, have just 
pushed the question into another country. 
There is a monetary theory, however, that is 
an alternative to both the fiat money and 
sound banking doctrines, that does deal with the 
business cycle and can be used with great success 
to reintegrate the history of the Bank war. It is 
the monetary and trade cycle theory of the 
Austrian school of economists, most notably 
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. von Hayek, 
and Murray N. Rothbard. In policy prescrip­
tions, the Austrian school is unabashedly /aissez­
faire and hard-money, and it has been largely 
ignored, although not refuted, by professional 
economists in this coun_try since the Keynesian 
revolution. However, its insights are essential if 
one is truly to understand the economy of the 
Jacksonian era. 
Austrian theory views money as a creation of 
the free market and not a creation of the state. 
When government intervenes in the sphere of 
money, it is usually for its own enrichment and 
always to the detriment of the market. A com­
pletely laissez-faire approach to money would 
imply private coinage and no legal tender laws. 
Government monopolies of the mint eventually 
result in coin debasement. Legal tender laws 
usually have the effect of fixing an artifical 
price between two types of money (e.g. gold 
and silver or specie and paper) and bringing into 
operation Gresham's Law (which is merely an 
application of a general principle about govern­
ment price fixing). Everyone should be free to 
use or to refuse whatever form of money they 
wish, and the market should set exchange rates 
between coexisting monies. [?OJ 
Sometimes governments intervene in the 
market by creating money which they force 
people to use. Banking, to the extent that it 
involves providing either a money warehouse 
or a loan service (bringing together prospective 
creditors and debtors) is a legitimate free market 
activity. Banking, to the extent that it involves 
the creation of money through fractional 
reserves, is fraud and an intervention into the 
market no different from money creation by 
government. However, it is not necessary for a 
laissez-faire society to outlaw fractional 
reserve banking and require 100% reserve 
ratios.'"' The same result could be attained if 
banking were totally free in the market sense, 
meaning that anyone could create unbacked 
money. No one would accept such money unless 
reasonably certain of redemption. Thus, banks 
would be limited in their ability to inflate'"' 
by the size of their clientele. Bank money would 
tend to depreciate to a level offsetting the risk of 
non-redemption. Another limit would be com­
petition between banks in the redemption of 
each other's notes. If Bank A operates at a 
lower reserve ratio and inflates more than its 
competitor, Bank B, then more of Bank A's 
notes will flow through the normal transaction 
of business into the hands of Bank B than those 
of Bank B will flow into the hands of Bank A. 
The resulting specie drain will force Bank A to 
deflate and bring up its reserve ratio. The oper­
ation of such a system of free banking would 
drive reserve ratios toward lOOOJo. Proponents 
of the Austrian school differ on whether they 
prefer the prohibition of fractional reserves as 
fraud or the free banking approach to achieving 
1000/o reserves.'"' 
The question at this point may be raised, if 
competition tends to drive up reserve ratios 
and prevent inflation, why didn't it do so during 
the Jacksonian era? The first part of the answer 
is that it did- to a certain extent. Sound bank­
ing theorists have always deplored the notorious 
tendency of bank notes to depreciate and banks 
to start runs on each other during this period. 
More important, however, was the fact that 
competition was restricted by all sorts of 
interventions that were part of the traditional un­
holy alliance between bank and state. Banks and 
governments throughout history have entered 
into a profitable symbiosis where the banks 
create money for the governments in return for 
special privileges.'"' Hammond has correctly 
pointed out that banks owe much of their growth 
"to government and the need it too had for 
credit. For governments always have been 
borrowers, and repeatedly their dependence 
upon banks has been critical, especially in war­
time"."" War and also the desire of states to 
finance internal improvements were the two 
major projects for which governments needed 
bank money during the Jacksonian era. Again I 
quote Hammond: "The wild-cats lent no money 
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to farmers and served no farmer interest. They 
arose to meet the credit demands not of farmers 
(who were too economically astute to accept 
wildcat money) but of states engaged in public 
improvements. "F81 
Among the special privileges received by 
banks from governments was the legitimacy and 
acceptability their notes gained by being put 
into circulation by the government. Chartered 
banks and state monopoly banks obviously had 
their competition limited, and we have already 
pointed out that the "free banking" system of 
the Whigs did not permit totally free entry and 
was far from free banking in a laissez-faire 
sense. A most important protection from com­
petition occurred in every financial crisis when 
the states granted the banks the privilege of 
suspending specie payments. Continually freed 
from the need to redeem their notes, it is no 
wonder that banks did not feel obliged to keep 
their reserve ratios high. Another factor was the 
general prohibition of interstate branch banking 
and the frequent prohibition of intrastate branch 
banking. '"1 Finally, usury laws, to the degree 
that they were enforced and effective, would 
decrease competition from banks with higher 
reserve ratios. 1781 
The most effective way for banks to protect 
themselves would be to cartellize and agree not 
to compete. For instance, Bank A could agree 
not to redeem the notes of Bank B but hold 
them as reserves upon which to expand its own 
notes, and this practice would also permit Bank 
B to expand. This arrangement can be called a 
collusive relationship, as opposed to the 
competitive relationship in which there is mutual 
redemption. The banks could also agree to 
inflate at the same rate, so that mutual redemp­
tion could continue with neither having to 
contract. Since voluntary cartels'"1 are notor­
iously unsuccessful, cartellizers frequently turn 
to government to make their cartels binding and 
effective. Central banking is a state cartelliza­
tion of the banking system and as such is the 
ultimate stage in the alliance between bank and 
state. It involves a collusive relationship bJ;tween 
the private banks and the central bank, in which 
the private banks hold the central bank's notes 
as reserves, 1" 1 with central bank control (direct 
or indirect) over the reserve ratios of the private 
banks so that all private banks may inflate to­
geiher. At the same time, the government usually 
grants legal tender status to the central bank's 
notes and uses them exclusively in its own 
transactions, inducing public acceptance. 
One of the many difficulties with orthodox 
schools of economics is that they treat internat­
ional and interregional trade asymmetrically. '"I 
According to Austrian theory, the principles of 
interregional or interlocal trade also apply to 
international exchange. The problem of the 
balance of payments is not a problem between 
nations; it is an example of the competitive 
relationship operating between competing 
central banks or banking systems. A drain of 
specie occurs in one country because that 
country's central bank is inflating faster than 
the central bank of the country to which the 
specie is flowing. Going off the gold standard or 
devaluing is the international equivalent of 
suspending specie payments. This analogy 
between international and interregional trade 
has even been noticed in a backward fashion by 
a few of the Jacksonian economic revisionists. 
Rockoff writes that, "In other words, one can 
treat each state as a small country in a gold 
standard world of fiXed exchange rates and 
free trade". "'1 Willett in his article compares 
the U.S. banking system of the nineteenth cen­
tury to the international monetary situation at 
the time he was writing,'" 1 and I have already 
pointed out that the same understanding 
informs Fraas' article.'84 1 
Bank inflation has many unfortunate con­
sequences, but the worst is the business cycle. 
When banks create new money, they do so in the 
form of credit. By increasing the supply of 
loanable funds, banks artificially lower the 
interest rate, inducing businessmen and entre­
preneurs to make investments they otherwise 
would not make. The creates a boom. However, 
according to Austrian theory, since the interest 
rate was artificially distorted, the boom consists 
of malinvestments which are not economically 
justified. Eventually the malinvestments must 
be liquidated in a cluster of business failures 
called a depression. That, in brief, is the Austrian 
business cycle theory. 1"I 
The traditional interpretation claims that the 
Second Bank was a central bank, but describes. 
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its functioning as if it were in a competitive 
relationship with the state banks. That is the 
meaning of Hammond's statement: 
Its [the Bank's] regulatory powers were dependent on 
the private banks falling currently into debt to it. The 
regulatory power now in effect under the Federal Reserve 
Act depends upon the opposite relation - that is, upon 
the private banks' maintaining balances with the 
Federal Reserve Banks. The private banks were then 
debtors to the central bank; they are now creditors.'ae 1 
In actuality, the Second Bank was only a primi­
tive central bank and its relationships with state 
banks could be both competitive and collusive. 
The fact that the reserve ratio did not increase 
under the Bank indicates, however, that the 
"regulatory" competitive element described by 
Hammond was not very strong. Although the 
reserve ratio did not fall either, the fall in the 
currency ratio demonstrates very clearly the 
operation of the collusive element. 1" 1 That 
explains the Bank's popularity with the state 
banks. Its popularity was not unanimous. There 
are always individual firms within an industry, 
usually the most efficient, that feel they have 
more to gain outside a government imposed 
cartel. On the whole, however, the following 
statement by Rothbard is extremely accurate: 
It is also a widespread myth that central banks are 
inaugurated in order to check inflation by commercial 
banks. The second bank of the United States, on the 
contrary, was inaugurated in 1817 as an inflationist 
sop to the state-chartered banks, which had been 
permitted to run riot without paying specie since 1814. 
It was a weak substitute for compelling a genuine 
return to specie payments.'111 
With a clear understanding of the nature of 
the Second Bank, the Jacksonian hard-money 
attack no longer comes across as confused and 
self-<:<>ntradictory. No longer can the Jacksonians 
be dismissed as either ignorant, anti-capitalist 
agrarians or as greedy entrepreneurs hoping to 
unleash the state banks. The attack on the Bank 
was a fully rational and highly enlightened step 
towards the achievement of a /aissez-faire 
metallic monetary system''" The J acksonians 
may not have been totally consistent. The exten­
sion of legal tender to foreign coins was a step 
in the right direction, but legal tender should 
have been expanded to private coinage as well, or 
even better, abolished altogether. Instead of 
expanding the government mint, they should 
have sold it. Instead of changing the fixed ratio 
between gold and silver, they should have had no 
fixed ratio at all. However, Jacksonian under­
standing of banking was far superior to that 
shown by politicians today. The war against the 
national Bank was only the first step in a 
struggle to eliminate fractional reserve banking 
entirely. After breaking the alliance between 
bank and state at the national level, the Jackson­
ians made a valiant effort to break that alliance 
at the state level as well. 
The Jacksonians unfortunately failed, not 
only because the Whigs with their neo­
mercantilist ideology pushed through "free 
banking" as a means of rearranging and 
extending the bank-state alliance, '"1 but also 
because the business cycle was an international 
phenomenon. America was subject to the 
monetary expansions and contractions occurring 
in other countries. When specie flowed into the 
U.S. from Mexico, it was because of an inflation 
there fostered by Santa Ana, "'1 and the specie 
stayed in the U.S. because of credit expansion 
by the Bank of England. When the Bank of 
England contracted to shore up its reserve 
position, a depression was precipitated in the 
U.S. 1" 1 
The Jacksonian attack on the Bank of the 
U.S. inspired a similar attack on the Bank of 
England by William Cobbett. He did not 
succeed, but his intellectual allies, the Currency 
School, did manage in 1844 to pass Peel's Act, 
which imposed a 1OOOJo reserve requirement on 
all further note issues. The Currency School was 
opposed by the Banking School, contemporary 
advocates of the sound banking doctrine. 
Ironically, Peel's Act also failed, because its 
restriction applied only to bank notes and not to 
money created in the form of deposits."'' The 
failure of the hard-money stalwarts in both 
England and the U.S. left the developing 
Anglo-American free market economy burden­
ed with the destabilizing effects of the business 
cycle. That was a tragedy the consequences of 
which we still suffer. 
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